Power Relationships along the Value Chain: Multinational Firms, Global Buyers, and Local Suppliers’ Performance by Pietrobelli, Carlo & Saliola, Federica
Power Relationships along the Value Chain: 





CREI, University of Rome 3 
c.pietrobelli@uniroma3.it
Federica Saliola 
CREI, University of Rome 3, and  
The World Bank 
saliola@uniroma3.it; fsaliola@worldbank.org  
 
Abstract 
There is a growing literature exploring the increasing fragmentation of production processes 
and the evolution of internationally-dispersed but functionally-integrated economic 
activities. However, most of this literature appears to neglect an important part of the story, 
that is the form and the organization of the relationships (the governance) among the 
various actors involved in these activities, and their implications for development. We 
develop this analysis in this paper, and explore it empirically with a new dataset on 
Thailand.  
In order to address this issue, we study global and domestic value chains in Thailand, and 
develop a quantitative measure of their governance, which takes into account different 
levels and types of buyers’ involvement with suppliers’ activities. We then use this measure 
to explore econometrically its relationship with suppliers’ performance.  
An important finding is that the relationships MNCs have with their suppliers is multifold 
and generally more intense than for domestic value chains. Our estimates suggest that 
more intense buyers’ involvement with local suppliers, not only in the definition of products’ 
characteristics, design and quality, but also in technology dissemination and R&D is 
generally associated with higher suppliers’ productivity. However, the governance of the 
value chain appears to affect the productivity of domestic value chains’ suppliers to a 
greater extent than for firms supplying MNCs or for exporters. We suggest that this result 
may be explained by the different nature of the information and knowledge being 
exchanged, and by the gaps between the leader and its suppliers.  
J.E.L. classification: F23, O14, O33. 
Keywords: Global Value Chains, Multinational Corporations, Foreign Direct Investment, 
Upgrading, Productivity 
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1 Introduction 1  
The increasing globalization of the world economy has changed the economic setting 
faced by industries and individual firms in developing countries, as it has in the 
industrialized world. One important feature has been the increasing fragmentation of 
production processes and the evolution of internationally-dispersed but functionally-
integrated economic activities. Remarkable trade integration and cross–border 
investments have been the result of these transformations, and their consequences 
have been widely studied.  
In particular, the international economics literature has had a lasting interest on the 
static and dynamic effects of this newly emerging paradigm and on the different forms 
that the international involvement of countries, industries and firms is taking. The 
term “international involvement” was first used by Lall (1980) with reference to the 
choice of US Transnational Corporations (TNCs) between exports and Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI). The same notion was extended by others (Oman, 1984, Markusen, 
1995), and now comprises a wider set of strategies that firms can jointly or individually 
use to serve foreign markets and/or gain access to assets available abroad, including 
licensing and other agreements with foreign partners, the creation of networks of sales 
agents, and the setting up of commercialisation affiliates abroad (Helpman et al., 2004, 
Castellani and Zanfei, 2006). However, many branches of the current literature, appear 
to neglect an important part of the story, that is the form and the organization of the 
relationships among the various actors involved in these channels, and their 
implications for development. We develop this analysis in this paper, and explore it 
empirically on Thailand. 
Following this frame of mind, the forms and the patterns of coordination and the level 
of hierarchy in such relationships may indeed matter for growth and learning 
processes, especially in developing countries. This may influence the benefits and costs 
of developing countries’ integration in global markets, as “…it is not only a matter of 
whether to participate into the global economy, but how to do so in a way which provides 
sustainable growth, especially for poor people and poor countries. … in recent years, we 
observed many countries and regions suffering from declining income shares while 
having experienced a growth of their participation in global trade” (Kaplinski 2000) 
                                              
1 The authors would like to thank Giuseppe Iarossi and Giovanni Tanzillo for making the data available. We also 
wish to thank Davide Castellani, Beata Smarzynska Javorcik and Antonello Zanfei for helpful comments. We are 
also indebted to seminar participants in the CNR Working Group on “International Economics and Development” 
workshop in Milan for their helpful suggestions. Financial contribution from the MIUR-PRIN project on 
“Capabilities dinamiche tra organizzazione di impresa e sistemi locali di produzione” is gratefully acknowledged. 
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors.  
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The relevance of coordination or governance of the relationships in international 
production and trade has been highlighted by the recent Global Value Chains (GVC) 
literature, which suggests that the governance and the actors of Global Value Chains 
importantly affect the generation, transfer and diffusion of knowledge (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2000). The GVC literature has tackled these issues mostly referring to 
developing countries, and debating on the opportunities and threats that GVCs may 
represent for LDCs. Thus, for example, a more critical view has argued that by adopting 
hierarchical forms of coordination, Global Buyers may operate to confine competencies 
of developing countries’ manufacturers to the simply assembly of imported material, 
making them potentially very vulnerable and subject to increasing competition and 
falling returns (Schmitz 2000).  
Drawing from some fundamental insight of the GVC literature, in this paper we attempt 
to investigate the patterns of governance arising in value chains led by Global Buyers 
and their impact on suppliers’ performance with specific reference to the Thai 
manufacturing industry. We integrate and build on the existing literature in three 
ways. 
First, we look at the case of whether the Global Buyer is represented by a Multinational 
Company (MNC). The GVC literature has the merit to include the governance of the 
relationships and the role played by Global Buyers into the study of the static and 
dynamic effects of openness. In spite of these merits, one of the major weaknesses of 
this literature is that the role of Global Buyers’ characteristics has been little explored 
beyond Gereffi’s (1994) categorization of “buyer-driven” and “producer-driven” 
commodity chains’, with their respective forms of governance.  Our line of argument 
instead is that heterogeneity in Global Buyers may significantly affect the way cross-
border relationships are governed, the extent of the transmission of knowledge, and the 
ensuing learning promoted in developing countries’ firms. More specifically, we 
distinguish between Multinational Companies and other chain leaders, MNCs are 
increasingly operating as global buyers, with their role not yet confined to production 
but progressively extending to planning and management of global networks of 
suppliers and firms. Moreover, the literature has traditionally considered MNCs as 
possessing some technological lead and exploiting this proprietary advantage in 
international markets (Dunning, 1993), and thereby potentially creating opportunities 
for knowledge diffusion and learning for their local suppliers (Turok, 1993; Albio et al., 
1999; Hewitt-Dundas et al. 2002).  
A second original contribution of this study is to define a quantitative measure of the 
Value Chains’ governance. To the best of our knowledge, the most part of existing 
analyses are based on case studies and surveys, thus merely offering descriptive 
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statistics and observations. Instead, we develop a measure and carry out econometric 
tests on this basis. 
Finally, we attempt a comparison between global and domestic value chains, and then 
between global value chains led by MNCs and those led by other global actors, in terms 
of governance patterns and the effects on suppliers’ performance and learning. We 
expect different forms of governance, more or less binding and severe for local suppliers 
in terms of products specification and standards’ enforcement, with the parameters set 
by the MNC more complex, requiring greater assistance and possibly creating 
opportunities for improving performances. At the same time, however, we are aware of 
“cherry picking” followed by MNCs when they carefully select their suppliers: local 
suppliers would be performing better ex-ante and not as a result of the assistance 
offered by the chain leader.   
For similar reasons the intensity and the extent of Buyers’ influence on suppliers’ 
performance is likely to vary between firms which are part of multinational’ s network 
and firms in value chains led by national buyers. We expect domestic firms, ex-ante 
less efficient than domestic firms working for MNCs, to heavily depend on the way the 
buyer assists them in improving products’ features and production processes. In other 
words, efficiency improvements are expected to be powerfully linked to the governance 
of the value chain.  
Section 2 overviews the theoretical background of the Global Value Chains approach. 
Section 3 illustrates the data we use and our value chain governance measure, and 
section 4 discusses the results of our empirical exercises. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The Global Value Chains approach 
The concept of value chain describes the full range of activities that are required to 
bring a product from its conception, through the different phases of production, to its 
end use and beyond. This includes activities such as design, production, marketing, 
distribution and support to the final consumer.  
The “Global Value Chain approach” focuses on the activities and the strategic role of 
the relationships with other firms and actors. Drawing from the transaction cost 
literature, Gereffi (1990) developed a framework that ties the concept of the value-
added chain directly to the global organization of industries. Later, he introduced the 
notion of “governance” of the Value Chains, defined as “authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain” (Gereffi, 1994). This concept is now central in the 
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literature. By focusing explicitly on the governance of disintegrated chains, and 
contrasting them to the relationships within vertically integrated chains, the global 
commodity chains framework draws attention to the role of networks in driving the co 
evolution of cross-border forms of industrial organization. 2
The literature highlights two critical parameters of the value chain governance: what is 
to be produced, and how it is to be produced. In each case, the level of detail at which 
the parameters are specified can vary. When the buyer plays this role, we refer to it as 
the "lead firm" in the chain. (Sturgeon 2002).3
In studies on the electronics sector, Sturgeon (2002) and Sturgeon and Lee (2001)) 
emphasize the complexity of information exchanged between firms and the degree of 
asset specificity in production equipment. They highlight three types of supply 
relationships, based on the degree of standardization of products and processes: (1) the 
"commodity supplier" that provides standard products through arm's length market 
relationships, (2) the "captive supplier" that makes nonstandard products using 
machinery dedicated to the buyer's needs, and (3) the "turn-key supplier" that 
produces customized products for buyers, and uses flexible machinery to pool capacity 
for different customers. Along similar lines, but more explicitly stressing governance 
and power relationships, Humphrey and Schmitz (2002 and 2002a) distinguish 
between suppliers in quasi-hierarchical relationships tied in a “captive” relationship, 
and “network” relationships between firms that cooperate because they possess 
complementary competences. 
Gereffi, Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) acknowledge, as do most other frameworks that 
seek to explain industry organization (such as, e.g. transactions costs, global 
commodity chains, organizational theory) that market-based relationships among firms 
and vertically integrated firms (hierarchies) make up opposite ends of a spectrum of 
explicit coordination, and that network relationships comprise an intermediate mode of 
value chain governance. They identify three key determinants of value chain 
governance patterns: the complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to 
sustain a particular transaction, especially with respect to product and process 
specifications; the extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, 
                                              
2 Gereffi and Memodovic 2003, Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2005, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002 and 
2002a, Kaplinsky, 2000, Schmitz and Knorringa, 1999;   
3 In the case of product definition, the buyer can provide different levels of specification. It can set a design 
problem for the producer, which the producer then solves by providing its technology and design. The buyer 
might provide a particular design for the producer to work on, or the buyer might even provide detailed 
drawings for the producer. Buyers can also specify process parameters.  Once again, these can be specified at 
different levels of detail. In some cases, the buyer may merely refer to the process standards to be attained. In 
other cases, the buyer will specify precisely how particular standards should be attained by requiring and 
perhaps helping to introduce particular production processes, monitoring procedures, etc. (Sturgeon, 2002) 
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therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specific investment between 
the parties to the transaction; the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in 
relation to the requirements of the transaction.  
The concept of governance in the GVC literature is mostly dynamic. Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2002a) underline three factors which may determine a governance change:  a) 
power relationships may evolve when existing producers, or their spin-offs, acquire new 
capabilities; b) establishing and maintaining quasi-hierarchical governance is costly for 
the lead firm and leads to inflexibility because of transaction specific investments and 
c) firms and clusters often do not operate only in one chain but rather simultaneously 
in several types of chains, therefore they may apply competencies learned in one chain 
to supply other chains. 
Although the final aim of most of these studies is to understand the reason and 
determinants of performance within value chains, the link between enterprise 
upgrading and GVC governance has been made explicit only recently. In a GVC context, 
upgrading is defined as innovating to increase value added (Giuliani, et, al., 2005, 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2006). Enterprises may achieve this in various ways, as for 
example by entering higher unit value market niches, by entering new sectors, or by 
undertaking new productive (or service) functions, and always deepening technological 
capabilities.4 In addition, within this context innovation is clearly not defined only as a 
breakthrough into a product or a process that is new to the world. It is rather a story of 
marginal, evolutionary improvements of products and processes that are new to the 
firm and that allow it to keep up with an international (moving) standard. 
The GVC perspective is useful for various reasons: first because the focus moves from 
manufacturing only to the other activities involved in the supply of goods and services, 
including distribution and marketing. These activities account for increasing shares of 
GDP worldwide. A second new and merit worthy perspective is that GVC emphasizes 
the nature of the relationships among the various actors involved in the chain, and 
their implications for development. Moving beyond firm-specific analysis and 
concentrating on inter-firm linkages, it allows for an easy uncovering of the dynamic 
flow of economic and organizational activities between producers within different 
sectors even on a global scale. For example even informal sector scrap metal collectors 
in South Africa are inextricably linked to a global export trade. They bring scrap metal 
in old trolleys directly to shipping agents who pay them London spot prices and 
transfer the scrap immediately to ships for export to iron and steel furnaces across the 
globe (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001). Furthermore the notion of organizational inter-
                                              
4 On the relationship between Technological Capability building and global value chains see Morrison et al., 2006. 
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linkages underpinning value chain analysis may make it easy to analyze the inter-
relationship between formal and informal work, with workers, particularly in developing 
countries, moving often seamlessly from one to the other, rather than viewing them as 
disconnected spheres of activity. Finally, by focusing on all links and phases in the 
chain (not just on production) and on all activities in each link, it helps identify which 
activities are subject to increasing returns in markets characterized by imperfect 
competition and segmentation.  
Addressing these issues however is not straightforward. From an analytical point of 
view, it implies the study of activities taking place outside firms, and in particular to 
understand the strategic role of the relationships with key external actors. Most of this 
literature is still based on case-studies and a systematic empirical methodology is 
lacking. Reliance only on case-studies has the privilege to capture country specificities 
and details, but its results are hard to generalize and do not lend themselves to easy 
and relevant comparisons. 
3 Governance Patterns of Thai Firms 
Why Thailand? 
Asian countries offer some of the most interesting case studies for value chains’ 
analysis. Thailand represents an attractive case of study in this context, due to the 
significant increase in value chain networks, and the important challenges the country 
is presently facing. Thus, several studies have provided evidence that Thailand is 
“technologically challenged” (The World Bank, 2005) and therefore needs to move 
beyond its traditional role in GVC as a low-cost manufacturing location. Furthermore, 
throughout the past decades, especially since 1986, Thailand has experienced a rapid 
increase in merchandise exports, growing from around one fifth of GDP in the early 
1980s to almost two thirds today.  
The rapid export growth has also been accompanied by rapid growth in private 
investment, both local and foreign. Indeed, Thailand has been one of the major FDI 
recipients in South-East Asia over the past two decades (Brimble and Sherman, 1999; 
Mephokee, 2002). In 2004, the Global Investment Prospects Assessment (GIPA) of 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) designed to analyze 
“future patterns of FDI flows at global, regional, national, and industry levels”, ranked 
Thailand as one of the four “top hot spots for FDI” in the world over the next four years, 
preceded only by China, India, and the United States. 
Data 
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The data come from the “Productivity and the Investment Climate Private Enterprise 
Survey” (PICS), conducted by the World Bank on a representative (stratified) sample of 
1,385 Thai firms from 2001 to 2003.5 For each firm the information is plant-based. The 
survey focuses on manufacturing firms (sectors 15–36 in the International Industry 
Standard Classification, ISIC). The industries considered are: Food Processing, Textile 
and Clothing, Wooden Furniture and Product, Auto parts, Electronics, Rubber and 
Plastic, Machinery and Equipment. Finally, the database contains comparable 
qualitative and quantitative information on foreign ownership, sales, technology, value 
chains, workforce education, exports and productivity. 
We define MNCs’ value chains as the relationships occurring between multinationals 
and Thai firms which sell most of their products to them, but are not owned by the 
MNC. Then, in order to exploit the information in the PICS database, we broke down 
the sample distinguishing between Thai firms serving only the domestic market (DOM), 
Thai firms which are large suppliers of multinationals but are not foreign owned (MNS) 
and Thai firms that export more than a threshold value of 5% of their output abroad 
but are not suppliers of MNCs (EXP) and not foreign owned. To avoid ambiguity in the 
analysis, we do not consider firms with more than 50 percent of equity owned by 
foreigners,6 (13 percent of firms in the sample).  Therefore, we use a reduced sample of 
1,197 Thai firms in the analysis, of which about 49 percent meets the definition of 
MNS, 14 percent that of EXP and 35 percent DOM.  
 
Table 1 – Distribution of groups of firms across industries 
  MNS DOM EXP 
  No % No % No % 
Textiles and Clothing 171 28.64 127 29.95 46 26.14 
Food Processing 115 19.26 16 3.77 43 24.43 
Machinery 79 13.23 58 13.68 10 5.68 
Electronics 36 6.03 36 8.49 10 5.68 
Wood 53 8.88 55 12.97 15 8.52 
Rubber and Plastics 81 13.57 96 22.64 44 25 
Automotive Parts 62 10.39 36 8.49 8 4.55 
Total 597 100 424 100 176 100 
Source: The World Bank - Private Sector Investment Climate (PICS) survey 2004 
 
                                              
5 We performed various tests to control for missing values, zero sales, zero employment, and observations failing to 
satisfy other basic error checks. 
6 OECD and UNCTAD use a benchmark of 10% as threshold ownership level. Other benchmarks taken by other 
researches include Sjoholm (1997) who had a benchmark 15 of equity owned by foreigners, Haddad and Harrison 
(1993) considered foreign firms as those with at least 5 % equity owned by foreigners, Djankov and Hoekman 
(1998) had a benchmark of 20%, while Castellani and Zanfei (2002) considered foreign firms as those with at least 
50 % equity owned by foreigners. 
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The distribution of firms is spread fairly equally across industries in our sample. The 
presence of EXP and MNS is concentrated in industries such as Food processing and 
Textiles and Clothing, while domestic firms are mainly concentrated in Textiles and 
Clothing and Rubber and Plastics (Table 1).  
Table 2 – Size and sales of firms in the sample 
  MNS DOM EXP 
Permanent workers       
median value 197 51 135 
mean 432 95 283 
Total sales       
average sales (current US$) $11,898,767 $1,657,910 $10,478,366 
Source: The World Bank - Private Sector Investment Climate (PICS) survey 2004 
A comparison of firm size (Table 2), computed in terms of total workers, shows that 
EXP and MNS are generally larger than domestic market-oriented firms. On the basis of 
the value of sales, domestic firms sell on average less than one fifth of what MNS and 
EXP sell.  Thus, EXP and MNS appear rather similar according to these statistics. 
The next step in our analysis is to define a measure of value chain governance on the 
basis of selected and available variables. This takes into account different levels and 
types of buyers’ involvement in the suppliers’ specification of product and process 
standards, R&D activities and dissemination of technology. Following the literature, 
and considering some characteristics of the Thai economy, we choose the following 
variables:  
o percentage of sales made exclusively to (suit) buyer’s unique specification 
(Cl.spec);  
o whether the buyer provided information on design/quality (product 
characteristics) (Prod inf. by client) and imposed product quality standards (Client 
enforcement); 
o whether the buyer engaged the firm in process or product R&D type of activities 
(R&D activities); 
o whether the buyer sent employees (personnel exchanges) to disseminate and 
diffuse new technologies into firms’ production facility (Empl. for tech diff.). 
Table 3 documents some descriptive evidence about these factors. Overall, the degree of 
buyers’ involvement in product definition is high in the sample, but much smaller for 
R&D and technology dissemination. On average, a larger share of firms which are part 
of value chains led by MNCs receive specifications of products and design by buyers, 
and the MNC is also involved in R&D activities and in technology dissemination. DOM 
firms seem to receive the lowest requirements and product and technology info by 
 9
clients, while EXP are in-between. On the contrary, in terms of sales made according to 
clients’ unique specification, EXP reveal the highest value.  
Table 3 – Thai firms’ relationships with buyers 
  MNS DOM EXP 
Cl.spec (mean) (1) 44.40 43.31 51.53 
Prod inf. by client (2) 78.97 68.87 75.15 
Client enforcement (3) 83.3 72.6 77.05 
R&D activities (4) 42.68 31.21 32.6 
Empl. for tech diff. (5) 39.79 24.42 28.36 
Source: Authors' own computation on The World Bank - PICS 2004 data. 
(1) % of sales made exclusively to buyers' unique specification.  
(2) Information on design/quality provided by the buyer.  
(3)  Product quality standards enforced by the buyer.  
(4) Engagement of the buyer in process or product R&D type of activities.  
(5) Employees from the buyer to work to disseminate and diffuse new technologies into 
suppliers' production facility. 
 
In order to capture different types of governance, we allow different combinations of the 
key variables above. It is important to remind that our index does not intend to reflect 
merely a growing involvement of buyers with their suppliers in all aspects of 
production, but rather focuses on crucial elements of the buyer-supplier relationship 
as setting product standards and quality requirements, and disseminating technology.  
 
          Table 4  – Classification of Value Chains’ governance 
Types of Value 
Chains’ Governance 










and process and 
product R&D 
G1 - Low requirements Less than 20% No No 
G2 - Higher requirements More than 20% No No 
G3 - Higher requirements & DQ More than 20% Yes No 
G4 - Higher requirements &Tech_RD More than 20% No Yes 
G5 - Higher requirements &DQ &Tech_RD More than 20% Yes Yes 
Our typology identifies five basic types of value chain governance (Table 4). G1 reflect a 
situation where less than 20 percent of total sales are made according to their clients’ 
unique specification, and suppliers do not receive substantial inputs from buyers; G2 
type occurs when the percentage of sales made according to buyer’ s specification is 
higher, but still suppliers do not receive information or involvement from the buyer; G3 
type reflects a situation where there is a relevant share of sales made according to the 
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client’s specification and buyers intervene to specify quality and design definition; in 
G4 a relevant share of sales are made according to the client’s specification and buyers 
are involved in technology dissemination and R&D activities, but without intervening in 
product design and quality; finally with G5 all forms of buyers’ involvement occur. 
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, it is instructive to look at the 
distribution of governance among the three groups of firms and across different 
industries. We also computed Chi-squared distribution tests to assess whether 
differences between MNS, EXP and DOM and across industries where significantly 
different from zero. 
All the governance types vary according to firms’ status in a statistically significant way 
(Table 5). Importantly, firms selling their products to MNCs are more likely to be 
involved in governance type G5 than firms selling to other buyers, both global and 
domestic. This means that MNCs get engaged in their suppliers’ R&D and send their 
experts to work to disseminate and diffuse new technologies more often than do other 
buyers. In contrast G3 is more frequent for firms which sell only to the domestic 
market, and for those which export through other channels.      
 
Table 5  – Distribution of governance across Thai firms and industries 
Governance by firms  
  G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
MNS 8.5 8.9 29.9 11.1 41.2 
DOM 15.4 13.5 31.7 12.1 26.5 
EXP 7.0 17.1 35.5 9.2 31.1 
Pearson chi2= 45.058 32.408 6.810 3.799 66.862 
Pr= 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.15 0.000 
Governance by industries 
  G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Textile and Clothing 9.0 9.0 39.6 8.5 33.9 
Food Processing 10.6 12.9 21.8 17.9 36.9 
Machinery 11.3 13.0 27.1 13.0 35.0 
Electronics 10.8 8.4 24.7 7.2 46.4 
Wood 15.2 14.4 34.4 7.2 28.0 
Rubber and Plastics 9.6 20.1 21.8 12.1 35.6 
Automotive Parts 7.6 8.3 32.4 16.6 34.5 
Pearson chi2= 16.2409 66.204 100.4292 59.1907 36.6493 
Pr= 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: authors' own computation.  
The distribution across industries mostly reflects this picture, with higher 
concentration in both types G3 and G5. However, some industrial specificity emerges, 
for example with electronics VCs mainly following a G5 governance, or wood and 
textiles/clothing with less encompassing forms of governance. What is remarkable and 
perhaps unexpected is that Value Chains with forms of governance G1 and G2 do not 
occur frequently, and not even in firms selling only to the domestic market.  
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This appears to confirm the widespread and growing evidence of various sorts of 
networks and forms of intense coordination among firms, with stand-alone strategies 
hardly occurring. Firms are always embedded into multiple linkages, and these 
linkages appear to be taking forms of increasing complexity. 
However, we need to go back to the main question of this paper: after showing, with 
quantitative evidence, that governance forms vary across GVCs, how does this matter 
for local firms’ efficiency and performance? 
4. Governance and Productivity 
We explore here the relationship between firms’ productivity and governance, focusing 
on the three groups of firms above, namely MNS, EXP and DOM. As a performance 
measure we employ total factor productivity (TFP). This measure is typically considered 
as a growth rate and consists of the wedge between the average growth of outputs and 
the corresponding average growth of inputs (Barba Navaretti et al. 2003). Moreover, 
this estimation technique has become increasingly popular in recent studies on FDI 
(e.g. Javorcik 2004, Blalock and Gertler 2004, Schoors and var der Tol 2002) setting 
the standard for the current literature.7
Our measure of TFP is defined as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
In order to take into account the problem of potential correlation between input levels 
and the unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks in the estimation of production 
coefficients, we carry out a panel data analysis using a semi parametric technique to 
estimate TFP.  The estimator used is that proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
with intermediate input use serving as a proxy for productivity shocks.8 More 
specifically, we utilize the information on the amount of electricity consumed by each 
plant. As electricity cannot be stored, its consumption is likely to follow changes in 
production activity more closely than the use of materials. 
The production function considered is the following: 
itititititit mklY εωδδδ ++++= 321                  (1.1) 
where mit is the intermediate input (electricity). The error term has two components, 
the transmitted productivity component ωit (or the state variable), and an error term 
                                              
7 Other authors use “upgrading” as a multidimensional measure of performance to encompass not only productivity 
improvements but also product improvements and firms’ growing involvement in new functions and sectors 
(Giuliani et al., 2005, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, Kaplinsky, 2000). Regrettably, this was not possible with the 
presently available dataset. 
8 Olley and Pakes (1996) develop an estimator that uses investments as a proxy for unobservable shocks. Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) suggest that investments are subjects to adjustment costs, thus not smoothly responding to 
productivity shocks. 
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which is uncorrelated with input choices εit. The state variable is not observed by the 
econometrician and affects firms’ choice of inputs, potentially leading to the 
simultaneity problem in production function estimation, first mentioned by Marschak 
and Andrews (1944).   
Thus, we construct our TFP measure as: 
)ˆˆˆexp(ˆ mklyw βββ −−−=        (1.2) 
A comparison of our TFP estimates between the three groups reveals important 
exporter premia in terms of productivity (average value 5.4, not reported here); MNS 
show quite similar values (average value 5.2), while DOM firms have lower values 
(average vale 4.6) 
We then test the relationship between governance and firms’ efficiency through the 
following specification, and using G1 as baseline category: 
ii eXGGGGTFP ++++++= 5432 43210 δδδδδ         (1.3) 
where X captures firms’ specific characteristics, including size, region and industry. We 
estimate two different specifications of the above equation: first, with our entire sample, 
then with the three sub samples of firms.  
As for similar research (e.g. “learning by exporting” literature), however, we are aware of 
the difficulties to define the direction of causality between buyer-supplier relationships 
and suppliers’ performance. More precisely, do such relationships cause suppliers’ 
performance improvements or rather buyers select more efficient firms as their 
suppliers? Unluckily, the limited number of years for which data are available cannot 
help us to establish the direction of causality with sufficient confidence in this paper. 
Results for the whole sample suggest a significant and positive relationship between 
firms’ productivity and governance G3 and G5 (Table 6). Higher share of sales made to 
client’s unique specification jointly with the involvement of the buyers in design and 
quality and in technology reveals important premia in terms of productivity compared 
to type G1. This confirms the qualitative results obtained by other authors (Schmitz, 
2004, Giuliani et al., 2005), although the new and different econometric tests make 
comparisons difficult.   
In a second specification of our model, documented in the last three columns of table 6, 
we repeat the estimation separately for each group using interaction terms. Restricting 
our attention to these sub-samples enables us to investigate the role played by different 
buyers. The results from this specification are qualitatively dissimilar from the previous 
ones and deserve careful interpretation. The emerging picture reveals that the way the 
value chain is organized is very relevant for DOM firms, while it does not appear to 
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matter for firms supplying multinational buyers (MNS), or for EXP. DOM firms with 
high customization of products to buyers’ standards, that also receive assistance on 
design & quality definition and R&D and technology dissemination (G5) are more 
productive than the others.  The mode of governance of their value chains is positively 
related to their productivity. 
Can we interpret these results to suggest that firms participating in domestic VCs rely 
on a greater involvement of the chain leader to foster their process of learning and 
efficiency improvement? As seen above, EXP and MNS have relatively higher level of 
TFP than DOM. Once again the problem of causality forces us to interpret these results 
very cautiously. On the one hand, MNCs may select their suppliers among the most 
efficient firms (i.e. “picking the best cherries”) – and indeed our data reveal that firms 
which are suppliers of multinationals are more efficient than DOM firms. We may 
explain this for example by observing that firms are often forced to improve their 
efficiency before starting the relationship with the MNCs in order to qualify as MNCs’ 
suppliers. In this case the form of governance of the VC would not matter for them 
initially, and we would need longer time series to test for the existence of possible 
dynamic learning processes.  
The same line of reasoning may apply to firms serving other foreign buyers (EXP), in 
agreement with the literature on “learning by exporting”9: efficient and above average 
performers firms are likely to be the ones that are able to cope with sunk costs, and 
exporters have most of the desirable performance characteristics several years before 
they enter the export market.  
On the other hand, if the self-selection hypothesis were not confirmed, the test of the 
existence of a learning process would require longer (dynamic) observations. Another 
possible explanation of these results that may deserve future testing might be due to 
the different nature of the information and knowledge exchanged within global and 
within domestic chains. Insofar the gap of competencies between multinationals and 
their suppliers is smaller in GVCs, it is easier to have cooperative relationships. In 
contrast, hierarchy is more likely to occur in national chains due to the suppliers’ poor 
level of skills and competencies. 
As a robustness check of the results, we use an alternative measure of firms’ 
performance: the net value added per worker. Value added is defined as sales minus 
intermediate input purchases. In table 7 we report results from regressing the 
governance types on the log of net value added per worker. These findings are generally 
                                              
9 Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1997, 1999, 2001; Aw et al., 2000; Kraay, 1999; 
Blalock and Gertler, 2003. For a review see Wagner 2006. 
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consistent with the picture we obtained from regressions based on TFP measure, except 
for G3. Looking at the whole sample, we find that only G5 matters for firms’ 
performance, meaning that only firms receiving assistance on design & quality 
definition and R&D and technology dissemination are more productive than the others. 
      
Table 6  – Firms' TFP and Value chains' governance 
Dependent Variable: log of TFP  
  ALL FIRMS MNS DOM EXP 
G2 0.21 -0.002 0.32 -0.126 
  -1.54 -0.01 (2.38)* -0.33 
G3 0.343 -0.139 0.693 0.007 
  (2.59)** -0.48 (3.79)** -0.02 
G4 0.101 -0.264 0.301 0.194 
  -0.76 -0.87 (2.04)* -0.48 
G5 0.389 -0.07 0.668 0.52 
  (2.80)** -0.22 (3.18)** -0.98 
Size dummies included included included included 
Industry dummies included included included included 
Region dummies included included included included 
Year dummies included included included included 
Constant 4.578 4.621 4.367 4.146 
  (22.08)** (11.54)** (11.61)** (9.69)** 
Observations 4022 4022 4022 4022 
R-squared 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.12 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: authors' calculation on  PICS 2004 data - The World Bank.  
Results for the three sub samples reveal again that governance seems to be very 
relevant for DOM firms, but not for MNS and EXP, in accordance with the results 
obtained with TFP. 
 
Table 7 – Firms' Value Added  and Value chains' governance 
Dependent Variable: log of Value Added per worker 
  ALL FIRMS MNS DOM EXP 
G2 -0.04 -0.26 0.28 0.35 
  -0.43 -1.45 (2.27)* 1.47 
G3 -0.02 -0.08 0.25 -0.13 
  -0.22 -0.59 (2.35)** -0.56 
G4 0.04 0.10 0.08 -0.45 
  0.43 0.61 (0.55)* -1.22 
G5 0.19 0.14 0.42 -0.07 
  (2.38)** 1.09 (3.82)** -0.28 
Size dummies included included included included 
Industry dummies included included included included 
Region dummies included included included included 
Year dummies included included included included 
Constant 4.578 4.621 4.367 4.146 
  (22.08)** (11.54)** (11.61)** (9.69)** 
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Observations 4022 4022 4022 4022 
R-squared 0.55 0.43 0.48 54 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Source: authors' calculation on  PICS 2004 data - The World Bank.  
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have explored the patterns of governance arising in value chains led by 
Global Buyers and their impact on suppliers’ performance with specific reference to the 
Thai manufacturing industry.  
In order to address this issue, we have developed a quantitative measure of GVC 
governance, which takes into account different levels and types of buyers’ involvement 
in the suppliers’ specification of product and process standards, R&D activities and 
dissemination of technology. Our typology identifies five basic types of value chain 
governance. We applied this typology to Thailand and compared the governance 
patterns and suppliers’ performance of GVCs led by MNCs, of domestic value chains, 
and of firms exporting through other channels. 
An important finding is that the relationships MNCs have with their suppliers is 
multifold, and as they get engaged in their suppliers’ process or product R&D and send 
their experts to work to disseminate and diffuse new technologies more often than 
other buyers. In contrast,  firms which are part of domestic value chains and those that 
sell to other global buyers prove to follow modes of governance that imply only 
involvement in defining design and products’ characteristics.  
How do these different modes of governance impact on local firms’ efficiency and 
performance? Our estimates show that more intense buyers’ involvement with local 
suppliers, not only in the definition of products’ characteristics, design and quality, but 
also in technology dissemination and R&D is associated with higher productivity.  
As we focus our attention to the three sub-samples of firms, we find that the way the 
value chain is organized is very relevant for domestic-led value chains, and affects 
these firms’ productivity. In turn, the mode of governance does not appear to matter for 
firms supplying MNCs or for exporters. High customization of products to national 
buyers’ standards, coupled with assistance on design & quality definition and 
technology dissemination is associated with higher local firms’ productivity. We suggest 
that this apparent paradox may be explained as a consequence of the different nature 
of the information and knowledge being exchanged, and of the gaps between the leader 
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